The following is an excerpt from the book Designing Secure Software: A Guide for Developers by Loren Kohnfelder, Copyright 2022, No Starch Press
The first group of patterns describe at a high level what secure design looks like: simple and transparent. These derive from the adages “keep it simple” and “you should have nothing to hide.” As basic and perhaps obvious as these patterns may be, they can be applied widely and are very powerful.
Economy of Design
Designs should be as simple as possible.
Economy of Design raises the security bar because simpler designs likely have fewer bugs, and thus fewer undetected vulnerabilities. Though developers claim that “all software has bugs,” we know that simple programs certainly can be bug-free. Prefer the simplest of competing designs for security mechanisms, and be wary of complicated designs that perform critical security functions.
LEGO® bricks are a great example of this pattern. Once the design and manufacture of the standard building element is perfected, it enables building a countless array of creative designs. A similar system comprised of a number of less universally useful pieces would be more difficult to build with; any particular design would require a larger inventory of parts and involve other technical challenges.
The Economy of Design pattern does not say that the simpler option is unequivocally better, or that the more complex one is necessarily problematic. In this example, *nix ACLs are not inherently better, and Windows ACLs are not necessarily buggy. However, Windows ACLs do represent more of a learning curve for developers and users, and using their more complicated features can easily confuse people as well as invite unintended consequences. The key design choice here, which I will not weigh in on, is to what extent the ACL designs best fit the needs of users. Perhaps *nix ACLs are too simplistic and fail to meet real demands; on the other hand, perhaps Windows ACLs are overly feature-bound and cumbersome in typical use patterns. These are difficult questions we must each answer for our own purposes, but for which this design pattern provides insight.
Strong protection should never rely on secrecy.
Perhaps the most famous example of a design that failed to follow the pattern of Transparent Design is the Death Star in Star Wars, whose thermal exhaust port afforded a straight shot at the heart of the battle station. Had Darth Vader held his architects accountable to this principle as severely as he did Admiral Motti, the story would have turned out very differently. Revealing the design of a well-built system should have the effect of dissuading attackers by showing its invincibility. It shouldn’t make the task easier for them. The corresponding anti-pattern may be better known: we call it Security by Obscurity.
This pattern specifically warns against a reliance on the secrecy of a design. It doesn’t mean that publicly disclosing designs is mandatory, or that there is anything wrong with secret information. If full transparency about a design weakens it, you should fix the design, not rely on keeping it secret. This in no way applies to legitimately secret information, such as cryptographic keys or user identities, which actually would compromise security if leaked. That’s why the name of the pattern is Transparent Design, not Absolute Transparency. Full disclosure of the design of an encryption method—the key size, message format, cryptographic algorithms, and so forth—shouldn’t weaken security at all. The anti-pattern should be a big red flag: for instance, distrust any self-anointed “experts” who claim to invent amazing encryption algorithms that are so great that they cannot publish the details. Without exception, these are bogus.
The problem with Security by Obscurity is that while it may help forestall adversaries temporarily, it’s extremely fragile. For example, imagine that a design used an outdated cryptographic algorithm: if the bad guys ever found out that the software was still using, say, DES (a legacy symmetric encryption algorithm from the 1970s), they could easily crack it within a day. Instead, do the work necessary to get to a solid security footing so that there is nothing to hide, whether or not the design details are public.